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PREVENTIVE DETENTION: A
COMPARISON OF BAIL REFUSAL
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED
STATES, ENGLAND, CANADA
AND OTHER COMMON LAW NATIONS
Kurt X. Metzmeiert
I. INTRODUCTION
With origins obscured in the mists of Anglo-Saxon history,
bail as an institution still unites the criminal law systems of
England, the United States, Canada and many nations of the
former British empire. However, conscious cross-comparison by
modern English-speaking legal reformers, rather than blind ad-
herence to ancient precedent, has caused many similarities in
the countries' legal practices. Examining each others' legal sys-
tems, critical articles and treatises, and law reforms, reformers
have carried on a debate on bail across national lines that has
been written into the law of nations from Canada to New Zea-
land. The United States, while not completely part of this dis-
cussion, has both contributed to and benefitted from this
debate.
Preventive detention,1 has been an important subject of
this transnational dialogue. As old as bail itself, preventive de-
tention pits the fundamental common law principle of the pre-
sumption of innocence against the desire by police and judges to
protect the public from purportedly dangerous defendants.
Although there has been a great deal of divergence in how the
t Reference Computer Services Librarian, University of Kentucky School of
Law, J.D. University of Louisville School of Law, 1995.
1 See discussion infra part II. Preventive detention is the refusal of bail for
the purpose of preventing future crimes or obstruction of the judicial process. As
opposed to a more narrow meaning of this word used in the third world to describe
legal procedures where political prisoners are held without charge for fixed, but
usually renewable, periods of times.
1
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issue has been resolved in individual nations, this conflict is at
the core of all the major bail reforms in the latter half of the
20th century.
The purpose of this article is to examine the treatment of
preventive detention in the laws and criminal procedures of the
major common law nations with a view toward dveloping some
principles universal to a model preventive detention law. This
article will focus on a number of common themes. First, it will
briefly outline the history of bail and bail reform in each sur-
veyed country. Second, it will examine the current law of bail
and preventive detention, focusing particularly on the factors
used to justify the denial of bail and which party has the burden
of proving these factors. Third, this article will examine
whether the practical effect of the bail law is just. Finally,
when appropriate, it will examine how a nation's fundamental
laws or charter of rights offers protection of a defendants' pre-
sumption of innocence and right to liberty that transcends the
legislative scheme.
In its conclusion, this survey will compare both positive and
negative features of the preventive detention laws of the sur-
veyed nations. Thus, this article will derive, based on the best
features of the bail laws surveyed, a model preventive detention
statute that meets society's conflicting interest in justice and
the prevention of crime.2 The touchstones of this discussion will
be the high value placed by the common law tradition on both
the presumption of innocence of persons accused of crimes and
the right to liberty from unjust seizures. These are fundamen-
tal human rights that should only be abridged upon proof of a
clear and particularized public interest.3
2 See Model Pre-Trial Release and Detention Statute infra Appendix.
3 International conventions recognizing the right to bail as a fundamental
right include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December
16, 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, Part III,
Art. 9, § 3:
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before a judge or other officer ... and shall be entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or release. It shall not be the general rule that
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be
subject to guarantees to appear for trial...
and the European Convention for The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5, Art. 5, §§ 1(c), 3:
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II. BAIL AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE ANGLO-SAXON
LEGAL TRADITION
The roots of bail trace back to the laws of the Anglo-Saxon
kings Hlothaere (673-685 A.D.) and Eadric (685-687)4 whose
laws provided that persons accused of a crime pay bohr, a from
of blood price, to the family of the victim, with the money being
returned if the accused was proven innocent. 5 Modern bail be-
gan sometime in the 9th or 10th century and evolved out of inef-
ficiencies of the early English court system.6 Under that system
the sheriff was required to arrest the suspect and hold him for
trial.7 An accused party was likely to wait years to be tried,
because of the large and haphazard judicial districts assigned to
the traveling medieval magistrates, as well as the general polit-
ical turmoil of the early middle ages.8 This was not only unjust,
it was also very impractical. Often the only lodging for defend-
ants was the sheriffs own home.9 To avoid this, defendants
were allowed to either pay a money bail or have friends and
relatives swear surety that the accused would appear for trial. 10
Thus, bail began as an effort to preserve the liberty of English-
men while ensuring the accused's presence at trial.
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty in the following cases and in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law: ...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose
of bringing him before the competent legal authority of reasonable suspi-
cion of having committed an offense or when it is reasonably considered
necessary to preventing his committing an offense or fleeing after having
done so;...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of par-
agraph 1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be enti-
tled to within a reasonable time or release pending trial. Release may be
conditioned by guarantees to appear to trial.
4 THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 18-23 (F.L. Attenborough
trans., 1922).
5 PAUL E. Dow, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 59 (1981). See generally ELSA DE
HAAS, ANTIQUITIES OF BAIL: ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CRIMINAL
CASES TO THE YEAR 1275 (1940).
6 JAMES FrrzAmis STEPHEN, I A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
233 (1883).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
3
PACE INT'L L. REV.
William I, using a common sense approach, adopted this
bail system after the Norman conquest in 1066.11 In 1275, Ed-
ward I attempted to reform bail practice.12 He was particularly
concerned that corrupt sheriffs were taking bribes to release
felons while denying bail to deserving persons who could not
pay both the bribe and the surety. 13 The First Statute of West-
minster' 4 codified the bail procedure and formally listed baila-
ble and nonbailable offenses. The list of crimes for which bail
was denied included murder, treason, jail-breaking and any
crime where the accused had confessed or effectively done so by
fleeing-all circumstances fitting within the purpose of prevent-
ing flight before trial.15 Additionally, bail was denied to coun-
terfeiters, forgers, poachers, "outlaws," and "thieves openly
defamed." 16 The likely justification for the inclusion of these
crimes was the prevention of future crimes and flight.
The concept of bail as an individual right arose from the
struggle in the 17th century between the barons of Parliament
and the King.' 7 The acceptance of the Petition of Rights in 1627
required that cause be shown before a person could be jailed.',
The Habeas Corpus Act of 167919 established a right to bail
11 Dow, supra note 5.
12 Curing general corruption in the English justice system was a central con-
cern addressed by Edward's First Statute of Westminster, but the King was partic-
ularly concerned that corrupt sheriffs were allowing well-placed felons to flee and
using their powers to oppress innocent citizens. L.F. SALZMAN, EDWARD I 199-200
(1968); T.F. TOUT, EDWARD THE FIRST 124-25 (1893); WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 457 (4th ed. 1936). The preface to the bail provision stated
Edward I's particular concern with abuse of bail, noting that:
forasmuch as Sheriff's, and other, which have taken and kept in prison,
Persons detected of Felony and incontinent, have let out by Replevin [bail]
such as were not replevisable, and have kept in Prison such as were re-
plevisable, because they would gain of the one party, and grieve the other
and because "before this Time it was not determined which Persons were replevis-
able, and which not," the King believed it necessary to precisely define the law of
bail. 3 Edw. I, ch. 12, (1275)(Eng.). JAMEs FITZJAMES STEPHEN, I A HisTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 234-35 (1883). See generally T.F.T. PLUNKNETT,
EDWARD I AND CRIMINAL LAW (1960).
13 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 234-235.
14 3 Edw. I, ch. 12, (1275XEng.).
15 STEPHEN, supra note 12, at 235.
16 3 Edw. I, ch. 12, (1275)(Eng.).
17 SALZMAN, supra note 12, at 201-202.
18 3 Car. I, ch. 1, (1627)(Eng.).
19 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, (1679)(Eng.).
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under certain circumstances and outlined a procedure to ensure
a bail hearing.20 The Bill of Rights of 1688,21 the crowning
jewel of the Glorious Revolution, outlawed excessive bail. 22 Yet
none of these reforms (which essentially wrested prerogatives
from the king for the benefit of the parliament) affected the bur-
geoning number of crimes for which bail was denied.23 In a
manner not unfamiliar to modern critics, the newly emboldened
parliament attempted to deal with increasing crime by denying
bail to additional capital crimes and offenses. By the time
Michael Dalton's popular manual for justices of the peace was
published in 1622, over 150 crimes were nonbailable. 24
III. UNITED STATES
As in many areas of English law, a simplified law of bail
was transplanted to colonial America. Early Americans valued
liberty and the presumption of innocence. Thus, the right to
bail was included in many colonial charters. 25 However, the
grounds for rejecting bail were largely reduced to situations in-
volving a risk of flight. 26
The founders of the American republic counted the right to
a just bail among the essential liberties. The Eighth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution guarantees against "ex-
cessive bail."27 A stronger expression of the contemporary
20 31 Car. II, ch.2, (1679)(Eng.). See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *297.
21 Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. (2d. Sess.), ch. 2, § 10 (1688)(Eng.).
22 "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. (2d. Sess.),
ch. 2, § 10 (1688)(Eng.).
23 Id.
24 MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 278-97 (1622).
25 BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606-1660 32-
33, 61 (1983). Historian Chapin counts the right to bail among the rights common
to all colonial charters.
Typical of these early bail provisions was that incorporated in the 1683 New
York Charter of Liberties: "That in all Cases whatsoever Bayle by sufficient
Suretyes shall be allowed and taken unless for treason or felony plainly and spe-
cially Expressed and menconed in the Warrant of Committment." AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 21 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1990).
26 CHAPIN, supra note 25, at 32-33. The number of capital offenses in early
America were far fewer than in England.
27 "Excessive bail shall not be imposed, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This provision is
5
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feeling about bail is found in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
which declared that "all persons shall be bailable, unless for
capital offenses, where the proof shall be evident, or the pre-
sumption great."28
usually agreed to have been based on Section 9 of the Virginia Bill of Rights: "That
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." VA. CONST. of 1776, § 9. However, this language
(drawn from the English Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. (2d. Sess.), ch. 2, § 10
(1688)(Eng.). See THOMAS, infra note 35) was part of several contemporaneous
state constitutions. DEL. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16; GA. CONST.
of 1777, § LIX; MD. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 22; MASS. CONST. of
1780, BILL OF RIGHTS, § 26; N.C. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 10; PA.
CONST. of 1776, § 29.
Whether the founders intended to create a right to bail with this sparse lan-
guage has long been a question of debate. See John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and
the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1224-1231 (1969)
(arguing against a right to bail). Contra Lawrence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:
Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 396-402
(1970) (arguing for the right to bail). There is little direct evidence from either the
Constitutional debates or the campaign for ratification. See Hermine Herta Meyer,
Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L. J. 1140, 1190-1191 (1972).
Nonetheless, other evidence indicates that several of the parties to the constitution
valued the right to bail. As its last act, the Continental Congress passed the
Northwest Ordinance, which incorporated a strong right to bail. See sources cited
infra note 28. In addition, one of the first acts passed by Congress was the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 which provided that "[ulpon all arrests in criminal cases, bail
should be admitted, except where the punishment may be death." 1 Stat. 91, ch. 20
(repealed by 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-3151 (1995)).
28 The source of the language of this bail provision, which was later incorpo-
rated into the constitutions of many U.S. states, has not been satisfactorily ex-
plained. The text of what became the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 "reflects its
gradual and uneven development through successive committee drafts." PETER S.
ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 59
(1987). After a 1784 draft by Thomas Jefferson failed to get the assent of the Con-
tinental Congress, two successive committees worked on a new draft which, after
revisions by Nathan Dane of Massachusetts (and perhaps Ohio Company agent
Manasseh Cutler), it was passed on July 13, 1787. Id. at 58; JAY A. BARRETT, THE
FIRST AMERICAN FRONTIER: EVOLUTION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 49-53 (1888);
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 1787: A BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK 18-19 (Robert M.
Taylor, Jr. ed., 1987). It was during this last revision that the right to bail was
drafted. Id. at 62. Barrett believes that Dane was the major architect of the rights
section and that he based the bail provision on the Massachusetts constitution's
excessive bail provision. See CHArN, supra note 25. More plausible is J. M. Mer-
riam's argument that the provision was based on Part 4 of the 1776 Constitution of
Connecticut: "And that no man's person shall be restrained or imprisoned by any
authority whatsoever, before the law has sentenced him thereunto, if he can and
will give sufficient Security, Bail, or Mainprise, for his Appearance and Good Be-
havior in the meantime, unless it be for Capital Crimes..." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 30 (1888). Unlike the excessive bail provision found in
many early state constitutions, this provision actually creates a right to bail in
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/4
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By the mid 19th century most state constitutions included
some sort of right to bail, often directly borrowing the language
of the Northwest Ordinance. 29 Typical of these provisions is
that of Alabama: "All persons shall, before conviction, be baila-
ble by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where proof
is evident, or presumption great."30
non-capital cases. Perhaps Dane (or Cutler) refined this idea into the final lan-
guage of the act.
The intended interpretation of the language, which has rarely been judicially
interpreted, is also somewhat murky. In oral arguments in the case of Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982), Justice Brennan asked the Assistant Attorney General
of Nebraska what the phrase "proof is evident and presumption great" meant in
the Kansas constitution. The Assistant Attorney General responded that he be-
lieved it to mean that "there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
will be convicted." The opposing public defender was more analytical:
Practically every state uses this language.. . . There seems to be three
different interpretations .... One is "that you can't even put on evidence
because the language creates an irrebuttable presumption.' Another is
that the burden is upon the accused to show that proof isn't evident or the
presumption great that he will be convicted. The third is that the state
bears the burden of showing a high probability of guilt. 30 CRIM. L. REP
4189, 4190-4191 (1982), quoted in John S. Goldkamp, Danger and Deten-
tion: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 7
n.26 (1985).
29 Ex parte Foster, 5 Tex. App. 625 (1879); Ex parte McAnally, 53 Ala. 495
(1875); People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539 (1862); Exparte Goans, 99 Mo. 193 (1889); Ex
parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673 (1853). See I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 261 (2d. 1866).
30 McAnally, 53 Ala. at 497. Today, 35 state constitutions state the right to
bail in almost these exact terms. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 22;
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 19; CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 12; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; IND. CONST. art. I, § 17; IowA CONST. art. I, § 12;
KAN. CONST. (BILL OF RIGHTS) § 9; Ky. CONST. (BILL OF RIGHTS) § 16; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 18; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; Miss. CONST. art. III,
§ 29; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 20; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 21; NEv. CONST. art. I, § 7;
N.J. CONST. art. I, pt. 11; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 9; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; OR. CONST. art. I, § 14; PA. CONST. art.
I, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 11; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 20.
However, several of these charters have been amended recently either to allow
preventive detention (Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Michigan,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas and Utah) or to apply the "proof is evident or pre-
sumption great" standard to non-capital crimes (the above mentioned states and
Rhode Island). Puerto Rico uses completely different language to guarantee the
right to bail (P.R. CONST. art. II, § 11), while Maine's constitution turns the "proof
or presumption" language on its head to create a presumption against bail for cer-
tain felonies: "No person before conviction shall be bailable for any of the crimes
7
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Such provisions were interpreted to make risk of flight the
only legitimate factor to consider in denying bail in non-capital
cases. In capital cases, the court weighed the evidence against
the accused to determine the party's likelihood of conviction.
However, this infringement of the presumption of innocence
was also justified on flight risk grounds: "When felony was pun-
ishable ... by death, if there was reason to believe the party
seeking bail was guilty, no bail could be accepted for him; be-
cause, in the language of the scriptures, 'all that a man hath, he
will give for his life.' "31
The Supreme Court, in Stack v. Boyle,32 later affirmed the
American doctrine that risk of flight was the sole legitimate
purpose for bail. The court noted that "unless the right to bail is
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured after centu-
ries of struggle, would lose its meaning."33 The court deter-
mined that the purpose of bail is to "serve ... as assurance of
the presence of an accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is excessive
under the Eighth Amendment."3 4
By the 20th century, despite the strong presumption to-
wards bail and the establishment of risk of flight as the only
proper grounds for denial of bail, a form of quasi-preventive de-
tention flourished in the United States. The cause of this was
the development of the bail bond system and the use of high
bail.35
As the nation grew and urbanized in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, gross inequities developed in the bail system.
Corruption in the criminal justice system ensured that wealthy
and politically connected defendants were released, while the
poor often spent as much time in jail awaiting trial as they were
likely to have to serve if convicted.36 In the South, the bail sys-
which are, or have been denominated capital offenses since the adoption of the
Constitution, when the proof is evident or the presumption great, whatever the
punishment of the crimes may be." ME. CONST. art. I, § 10.
31 53 Ala. 495, 497 (quoting 1 BISHOP, supra note 29, at § 255).
32 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
33 Id. at 4.
34 Id. at 5.
35 WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 4 (1976).
36 Id.
[Vol. 8:399
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tern became just one part of the systematic denial of civil rights
of African Americans. 37
The most visible embodiment of this corruption of the right
to bail was the bail-bondsmen, who stalked the corridors of city
police courts and county houses. 38 These unofficial adjuncts to
the criminal justice system supplanted the judges as true arbi-
ters of who would go free or not. Unbound by any law, they set
bail based on experience, gut instincts and long-developed
prejudices. 39
Although this system had been criticized as early as 1922
by Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter,40 it was not until the
1960's that the American bail system was seriously challenged.
In 1961, philanthropist Louis Schweitzer visited a jail in Brook-
lyn, New York and was "appalled" to find that detainees await-
ing trial were treated like convicts. He was even more
concerned to find that many were acquitted or given non-jail
sentences after an average wait of over a month.4 1 As a result,
he created the Vera Foundation which instituted the Manhat-
tan Bail Project. Working with New York University Law
School, the Vera Foundation posted bail for defendants with
strong community ties and tracked whether they made their
court appearance. The experiment proved that defendants re-
leased on their own recognizance had a lower non-appearance
rate than those under the old money bail system. 42
The Manhattan Bail Project caught the eye of President
John F. Kennedy. President Kennedy invited the Vera Founda-
tion to join with his Justice Department to co-sponsor a Na-
tional Conference on Bail & Criminal Justice (NCBCJ) in 1964
and 1965. 43 The NCBCJ's study of bail eventually concluded
with recommendations favoring the expansion of own-recogni-
37 Gilbert Ware, Criminal Justice and Blacks, in FROM THE BLACK BAR:
VOICES FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 82-83 (G. Ware, ed., 1976).
38 PAUL B. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE (1974).
39 Id.
40 CmuS W. ESKRIDGE, PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMMING: ISSUES AND TRENDS
23-27 (1983).
41 THOMAS, supra note 35, at 4.
42 ESKRIDGE, supra note 40, at 25-26.
43 National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, Proceedings of May 27-
29, 1964 and Interim Report, May 1964-April 1965 (1965) (hereinafter NCBCJ);
see NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Robert M. Fogelson ed.,
1974).
9
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zance bonds, that were ultimately adopted in the federal Bail
Reform Act of 1966.4 4 The 1966 law created a presumption in
favor of own-recognizance release and set forth model condi-
tions to structure pretrial release. 45
The NCBCJ also examined the setting of high bail as a
method of preventive detention. During the conference, several
judges and prosecutors frankly discussed the use of high bail to
preventively detain defendants deemed dangerous to the com-
munity.46 Many justified this use by saying that a determina-
tion of dangerousness to the community was indivisibly mixed
into the weighing of risk of flight.47
Unmentioned in the discussion of high bail was a frank ap-
praisal of an open prevention detention provision. The commit-
tee discussion divided, predictably, between those for whom any
form of preventive detention was an unconstitutional assault on
liberty and those for whom it was one element of a reasonable
setting of bail. Left untouched was any suggestion that an
open, regulated system of preventive detention could be more
44 THOMAS, supra note 35, at 7.
45 THOMAS, supra note 35, at 7. The 1966 Act led to parallel reforms of bail in
the states. Twenty states created a presumption toward release on recognizance in
bailable categories. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (1985); ARIz. RULES CRIM. PROC.
7.2(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1205 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (1981 &
Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE § 811.2 (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.520 (1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1026 (Supp. 1994); MD. RULES 4-216; MINN. RULES CRIM.
PRoc. 6.02; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29:901 (1989 & Supp. 1992); N.M. RULES CRIM.
PRoc. 4.02; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(a),(b) (1994); N.D. RULES CRiM. PRoc. 46(a);
OR. REV. STAT. § 135.245(3) (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-10 (Law. Co-Op 1985);
S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 23A-43-2 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-11-115, -116
(1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1554 (1974); WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CRIM. RULES 3.2;
WIS. STAT. §§ 969.01, .02 (1985 & Supp. 1994); Wyo. RULES CRIM. PRoc. 8(c)(1).
Most others allow own-recognizance bonds in more limited circumstances.
Goldkamp, supra note 28, at 11 nn.38-39. As the use of own-recognizance bonds
became widespread, bail-bondsmen began to be more closely regulated. In 1978,
Kentucky completely abolished bail-bondsmen. The statute was upheld in Benboe
v. Carroll, 625 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1980). See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Valid-
ity of Statute Abolishing Commercial Bail Bond Business, 19 A.L.R.4th 355 (1983).
Where they have not been banned outright, bail-bondsmen have been largely dis-
placed by laws allowing deposit bail. See Goldkamp, supra note 28, at 13 n.47.
46 NCBCJ, supra note 43, at 149-219.
47 NCBCJ, supra note 42, 200-202. The nearly 300 U.S. police, court officials
and judges surveyed by Paul B. Wice in 1971 were more candid. Nearly 48%
agreed that judges set bail higher than a defendant could afford in order to preven-
tively detain persons identified by police as "dangerous." Paul B. Wice, Bail Re-
form in American Cities, 9 CraM. LAW BULL. 787 (Nov. 1973); See also PAUL B.
WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF PRETRIAL RELEASE (1974).
[Vol. 8:399
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fair and just than a system where unstated preventive factors
were hidden within unwritten bail decisions.
Despite the NCBCJ's discussion of preventive detention,
Congress decided not to deal with this "problem" in the 1966
Act. However, the House Judiciary Committee averred that
"pretrial bail may not be used as a device to protect society from
the possible committing of additional crimes by the accused."48
The first move toward a system of explicit preventive deten-
tion occurred in 1970 when Congress enacted a preventive de-
tention statute for the District of Columbia. 49 The experience of
the D.C. law provided the background to the Bail Reform Act of
1984.50
The legislative history of the 1984 Bail Reform Act reveals
two major concerns. 51 First, Congress was concerned that
crimes were being committed by accused felons out on bail.52
Second, Congress recognized that, rather than releasing defend-
ants they deemed dangerous, some judges were setting exces-
sive release conditions and high money bail.53 The Senate
Judiciary Committee, in its report, expressed the belief that the
Act would "promise fairness, and effectiveness for society, the
victims of crime-and the defendant as well."54 Despite these
considerations, the language of the act itself suggests that con-
cerns over drug trafficking were also a major impetus for the
law. 55
Under the Bail Reform Act a federal judge "shall order the
detention" of a person accused of a federal crime if he or she
finds that "no conditions or combination of conditions will rea-
sonably assure the appearance of the [defendant] as required
and the safety of any other person ... before trial" (emphasis
added).56
48 H.R. REP. No. 1541, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), quoted in Ann M.
Overbeck, Detention for the Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 55 CINC. L.
REV. 153, 159 (1986).
49 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1981).
50 Overbeck, supra note 48, at 160.
51 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983). See generally Overbeck,
supra note 48, at 155-160.
52 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 11.
55 18 U.S.C. § 3141(e),(f) (1984).
56 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1984).
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A rebuttable presumption for preventive detention arises if
a defendant has:
(1) been convicted of a Federal crime involving violence, a crime
involving a life sentence or the death penalty, drug trafficking
with possible sentence of over 10 years or two of the above de-
scribed offenses; and
(2) the current crime occurred while the defendant was on bail
awaiting trial; and
(3) the defendant committed the current crime less than five
years after release from jail for any crime described above. 57
The federal prosecutor can move for a detention hearing if the
case involves any of the above listed crimes or if they believe
there is:
1. serious risk of flight,
2. a serious risk that the person will obstruct or attempt to ob-
struct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to
threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.58
In determining a preventive detention motion, the judge
must determine whether there are conditions of release that
would "reasonably assure the appearance of the person.., and
the safety of any other person and the community."59 In assess-
ing this, the judge "shall take into account" the following
factors:
1. nature of crime; whether it involves violence or drugs;
2. "weight of the evidence;"
3. person's history, including character, physical & mental condi-
tion, job, finances, length of residence, community ties, drug
abuse history, prior criminal & bail appearance record; and
4. nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the com-
munity that would be posed by the person's release.60
The defendant or prosecutor can appeal a decision of a magis-
trate, judge or any other person other than the judge of the
court of original jurisdiction to revoke bail. If this option did not
57 Id.
58 Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
59 Id. § 3142(f).
60 Id. § 3142(g).
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exist, only the person subject to detention may appeal the
court's decision. 61
Beyond the general criticism of preventive detention in
principle,62 there is much room for criticism of the Bail Reform
Act. First, the Act gives a great deal of discretion to judges.
Although they are given a list of factors to consider, they need
only "take [them] into account" in ruling.63 There are British
and Canadian cases that illustrate the dangers of conferring too
much judicial discretion regarding preventive detention.64 Sec-
ond, the factors themselves appear arbitrary; why should a non-
violent drug charge be grounds for detention? Finally, the
scheme itself is confusing. The same factors are used to evalu-
ate a risk to the public safety that are used to evaluate a risk of
flight. There are two criticisms: First, the interests implicated
by detention based on risk of flight are of a different nature
than those implicated by preventive detention. In a flight risk
determination, the state has a strong, narrowly defined interest
in assuring the accused's attendance at trial. The defendant's
right to liberty is constrained by such detention. However, his
or her presumption of innocence is not (or should not) be di-
rectly impaired. In contrast, determining whether to preven-
tively detain a defendant, the state asserts a broader, more
speculative interest in preventing future crimes. The defendant
is forced to defend his or her right to liberty and the presump-
tion that they are innocent-because the underlying message of
preventive detention presumes that the defendant is guilty of
the crime charged and seeks to prevent the repetition of that
crime.65
61 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b),(c) (1984); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970).
62 See Lawrence Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World
of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371 (1970).
63 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1984).
64 See discussion infra part V. R. v. Phillips, 32 Crim. App. 47 (1947)(Eng.);
R. v. Dernyen, [1975] 26 C.C.C. (2d) 324 (Sask. C.A.), per Culliton, CJS.; R. v. Pow-
ers, [1972] 9 C.C.C. (2d) 533 (sub nom Powers v. R.) (Ont. H.C.).
65 Because of these inherent differences, separate tests should be employed to
assess risk of ffight and risk of harm to the public. The factors used to justify these
two types of detention should be narrowly tailored to protect the interests in-
volved. Flight risk should be assessed by the traditional means: community ties,
prior bail appearance record, opportunity for flight, etc. The factors used to justify
preventive detention should narrowly focus on evidence that tends to increase the
likelihood that the defendant would harm someone while on bail: whether the
crime charged involves violence; defendant's prior history of violence; prior history
13
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The constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act was deter-
mined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno.66 Sa-
lerno involved two defendants indicted for twenty nine counts of
racketeering and denied bail under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). The
court examined two constitutional challenges to the Act: sub-
stantive due process and the Eighth Amendment right to be
free from excessive bail. In evaluating the due process claim,
the court determined that preventive detention was regulatory,
not punitive.6 7 Furthermore, the "incidents of pretrial deten-
tion" were not "excessive" in relation to the regulatory goals
sought by Congress. The Court argued that the Act "carefully
limits the circumstances under which detention may be sought
to the most serious of crimes."68
Turning to the Eighth Amendment claim, the Court re-
jected the argument that Stack v. Boyle69 applied to the case.
The Court found Stack (which dealt specifically with the dollar
amount of the bail) was irrelevant because the lower court in
that case had no occasion to consider whether bail could be
preventively denied.70 The Court, in Stack, further noted that
the right to bail had never been considered absolute and that
persons accused of capital crimes and risk of ffight had long
been subject to bail restrictions.7 1 The Court upheld § 3142(g),
determining that "nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits
permissible Government considerations solely to questions of
flight."72
The United States is unique among common law nations in
the primacy it still places on appearance at trial as the basis of
bail. In the 1960's, reforms restored the traditional American
presumption towards bail. Although a judicially regulated and
open form of preventive detention appears preferable to one
that is unregulated and covert, there are problems with the lan-
of violence while on bond; membership in a gang or criminal syndicate; whether
the crime charged involves domestic violence and the defendant has a history of
domestic violence; whether defendant has ever threatened witnesses in this or
other trials; etc.
66 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
67 Id. at 746-47.
60 Id. at 747.
69 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
70 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753.
71 Id. at 754.
72 Id.
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guage of the Act. The 1984 Bail Reform Act, and state preven-
tive detention laws inspired by it,73 have been criticized for
diverging from this tradition. Perhaps the worst possible criti-
cism of the federal preventive detentive law is that, in practice,
it is still infrequently used by federal judges, who still feel more
comfortable reaching the same goal by setting excessive bail,
but are careful not to offend the Eighth Amendment.
IV. UNITED KINGDOM
English magistrates, from the Statute of Westminster in
1275 until the Bail Act of 1826, used the same primary factors
to decide whether bail should be granted remained the same.
Three principles, derived from the lists of bailable and non-bail-
able crimes,74 controlled bail decisions: the seriousness of the
offense; the likelihood of the accused's conviction and the "out-
lawed" status of the offender. 75
The 1826 Act abolished the Westminster Act and its succes-
sors. 76 Later, an 1835 act authorized bail for any offense, so
long as granting bail did not "endanger the appearance of [the
accused at trial]" even if "the circumstances are such to raise a
presumption of guilt."77 The primacy of appearance at trial as
the central purpose of bail was crystallized by Justice J. Coler-
idge in two mid-19th century cases. In R. v. Scaife,78 a forgery
case, he opined: "I conceive that the principle on which persons
are committed to prison.., previous to trial, is for the purpose
of ensuring the certainty of their appearing at trial."79 In R. v.
Robinson,80 Coleridge set out three "general questions" to assist
in determining whether the accused would likely appear. First,
73 In the last two decades, eleven states have amended their Constitutions to
permit the denial of bail in order to protect public safety: ARIZ. CONST. art. 11,
§ 22(3); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12(b); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19(b); FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 14; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15(c); Miss. CONST. art. III,
§ 29; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 11; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8;
WIs. CONST. art. I, § 8.
74 3 Edw. I, ch. 12. For discussion, see supra, sec. II.
75 A. Bottomley, The Granting of Bail Principles and Practice, 31 MOD. L.
REv. 40, 45 (1968).
76 7 Geo. IV, ch. 64 (1826)(Eng.).
77 5 & 6 Will. IV, ch. 33 (1835)(Eng.).
78 10 L.J.M.C. 144 (1841).
79 Id. at 145.
80 23 L.J.Q.B. 286 (1854).
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"what is the nature of the crime, is it grave or trifling?""" Sec-
ond, "what is the probability of a conviction?"82 Finally, "what
is the probable punishment in the event of conviction?"8 3 The
three Robinson factors remained the text-book test for bail de-
terminations until the 1976 bail reform.8 4
The 1835 Act and its predecessors only gave judges the dis-
cretion to release defendants on bail, and did not create a right
to bail. Thus, neither the British statutes nor the precedent of
Robinson prevented judges from denying bail to protect the pub-
lic. In R. v. Phillips,85 the Court of Criminal Appeal denied bail
to a repeated burglar and noted that if a court determines a
persistent felon is likely to commit future crimes while on bail,
bail should be denied. The Phillips opinion spawned a shift to-
ward preventive detention in the 1950's and early 1960's. In R.
v. Wharton,8 6 Chief Justice Lord Goddard chastised a previous
court for bailing a robber who later committed the same crime
while on bail: "It is surprising to find that the magistrates ad-
mitted him to bail considering his past record, because he had
been convicted over and over again .... This is what comes of
granting bail to these men with long records."8 7 The British
Home Office subsequently circulated a transcript of these re-
marks to all magistrates.88 The point was further articulated in
R. v. Armstrong:8 9 "It is clear that it is the duty of the justices
to inquire into the [criminal record of the accused] and if they
find he has a bad record.., that is a matter which they must
consider before granting bail" (emphasis added). By the 1960's
it was clear that preventive detention for even minor crimes
was the policy of the Court of Criminal Appeals. 90
Given the power of the courts to preventively detain even
non-violent offenders, it is not surprising that when reformers
81 Id. at 287.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 ARCHBOLD, PLEADING EVIDENCE & PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 203 (36th
ed. 1966).
85 32 Crim. App. 47 (1947)(Eng.).
86 Henry Palmer, Bail - Prisoner with a Bad Criminal Record, (19551 CRIM.
L. REV. 565.
87 Id.
88 Bottomley, supra note 75, at 52.
89 [1951] 2 All E.R. 219.
90 Bottomley, supra note 75, at 52.
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examined the British bail system in the 1960's, they found it
rife with inequities. A 1967 study found that 36.5% of persons
scheduled for trial were in detention.9' The majority remained
in jail from the arrest to the trial. The arrest stay averaged 31
days (about the same as the Manhattan Project found in Brook-
lyn, New York). Furthermore, 20% of those convicted after be-
ing detained received non-jail sentences. 92
Drawing on the efforts of American and Canadian reform-
ers, as well as studies by British groups,9 3 the Home Office be-
gan to seriously consider reforming the bail system. A Working
Party was created 94 and later the Bail Act of 1976 was intro-
duced.9 5 One primary goal of the Working Party was to create a
law outlining "generally accepted criteria" and "uniform proce-
dures" for the granting or denying of bail. 96 The group outlined
five considerations for bail determination: 1) appearance at
trial (the primary consideration); 2) likelihood of further of-
fenses; 3) further police inquiries; 4) interference with wit-
nesses and 5) protection of the defendent.9 7
The 1976 Bail Act 98 met most of the Working Party's goals.
It set out rational criteria for bail decisions and uniform pro-
cedures. Significantly, it required judges to set out their rea-
sons for denying bail. Finally, it set a strong presumption to-
wards the grant of bail.
The structure of the Act emphasizes this presumption to-
wards bail. Section 4 commands that bail shall be granted ex-
cept as provided by Schedule 1 to this Act.9 9 Schedule 1
contains the only justifications for denial of bail. Part II of the
schedule states that persons accused on non-imprisonable of-
fenses can only be denied bail if they have previously broken
91 Michael Zander, Bail: A Re-Appraisal [1967] CRIM. L. REV. 25.
92 Id. at 31.
93 MICHAEL KING, BAIL OR CUSTODY (1973).
94 Denis Galligan, Working Paper on Bail, 38 MOD. L. REv. 59 (1975). See
Michael King, Bail Reform: The Working Party and the Ideal Bail System, [1974]
CRIM L. REV. 451; Martin Wright, Bail Recognition of the Need for Reform, [1974]
CRIM. L. REv. 457.
95 Bail Act, 1976, ch. 63 (Eng.).
96 Galligan, supra note 94, at 60 (quoting BAIL PROCEDURES IN MAGISTRATES
COURTS (H.M.S.O. Working Paper, para. 53, 1974)).
97 Galligan, supra note 94, at 60.
98 Bail Act, 1976, ch. 63 (Eng.).
99 Bail Act, 1976, ch. 44, § 4(1) (Eng.).
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bail. Part I, Paragraph 2 lays out the exceptions to the right to
bail for those accused of imprisonable offenses. The court need
not grant bail "if the court is satisfied that there are substantial
grounds for believing" that if bail is granted the defendant
would:
(a) fail to surrender to custody
(b) commit an offense while on bail, or
(c) interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of
justice. 100
Paragraph 9 indicates that in making a paragraph 2 decision,
the court "shall have regard to such of the following considera-
tions as appear to it to be relevant:" 1 1
(a) the nature and seriousness of the offense
(b) the character, antecedents [i.e. criminal record], associations
and community ties of the defendant
(c) the defendant's prior bail record
(d) the strength of the evidence.
Furthermore, the magistrate may regard "any other [factors]
which appear relevant."
There have been few judicial interpretations of the Bail Act.
This suggests that it is successful. One issue of note is the in-
terpretation of the requirement that the judge "be satisfied that
there are substantial grounds for believing" one of the factors in
paragraph 2.102 In R. v. Slough JJ ex p. Duncan,10 3 the court
held that the judge's subjective belief that the grounds existed,
rather than a post hoc objective assessment. Although the rele-
vance of Duncan primarily relates to appeals and the scope of
judicial review, it is not hard to see its potential for expanding
judicial discretion.
A number of criticisms of the 1976 Bail Act's provisions for
denying bail exist. The primary concern is that persons in cir-
cumstances where there is little likelihood that they would face
imprisonment upon conviction are being denied bail under one
100 ARCHBOLD, supra note 84, at 221, (citing Bail Act, 1976, ch. 23, Sched. I, Pt.
I, para. 2 (Eng.)).
101 ARCHBOLD, supra note 84, at 222, (citing Bail Act, 1976, ch. 23, Sched. I, Pt.
I, para. 9 (Eng.)).
102 ARCHBOLD, supra note 84, at 214.
103 75 Crim. App. 384 (1982)(Eng.).
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of the three permitted reasons for detention. 10 4 In a controver-
sial 1992 paper, Legislation on Bail: What Should Be Done?,
the advocacy group NACRO called for a new provision to re-
quire courts refusing bail to certify that a custodial sentence
would be likely if the accused is convicted.' 05
Furthermore, the Canadian high court's decision in R. v.
Morales,0 6 has led some to urge that the British law to
amended so that judges be required to find a more particular-
ized threat that the accused was likely to flee, commit future
crimes or interfere with witnesses.'0
7
Recently, however, Parliament has enacted laws limiting
the ancient right of a defendant to remain silent. They have
expanded the rights of police to stop and search persons sus-
pected of preparing a "rave" (i.e. a dance party held on property
not owned by the partiers). 08 Given these efforts by Parlia-
ment to chip away at civil liberties, further bail reform is not
likely until the Labour party returns to power.
V. CANADA
Before the British North America Act created the Canadian
Confederation in 1867, British legal precedents formed the ba-
sis of Canadian law.10 9 That is, bail was a matter of right for
misdemeanor crimes and discretionary for felonies. 1 0 Part of
Canada's first criminal legislation gave magistrates the discre-
tion to grant bail for all crimes."' At first, Canadian courts rec-
104 Andrew Ashworth, Liberty Before Trial, [1993] CRIM L. REV. 1.
105 Nicola Padfield, The Right to Bail: A Canadian Perspective, [19931 CRIM. L.
REV. 510.
106 [1993] 77 C.C.C. (3d) 91; 17 W.C.B. (2d) 580
107 Ashworth, supra note 104 at 2. The current government has taken an op-
posite direction, promoting legislation creating presumptions against bail for pre-
vious bail-jumpers and persons who once were convicted of serious offenses.
Andrew Ashworth, Coping with the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, [1995]
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2.
108 Andrew Ashworth, Coping with the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act,
[1995] CRiM. L. REV. 1-3. Large sections of the British legal community have op-
posed these measures, which appear to violate elements of the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights. Id. at 3. The Labour party (which has been leading the
Conservatives in polls by margins of three-to-one) has pledged to reverse many of
the more controversial aspects of recent Criminal Justice Acts.
109 GARY T. TROTTER, THE LAW OF BAIL IN CANADA (1992).
110 Id. at 2.
111 Act Respecting the Duties of Justices of the Peace, S.C. ch. 30 (1969)(Can.).
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ognized English precedents like Robinson which made the
accused's appearance at trial the primary purpose of bail.11 2
The factors courts used to determine the risk of non-appearance
were also similar to those used in England: seriousness of the
offense; strength of the evidence; the accused's character and
standing in the community.'1 3 A recent commentator has noted
that Canadian courts placed significant emphasis on the seri-
ousness factor and that "may have reflected an implicit regard
for factors other than the likelihood of the accused's attendance
at trial."114
The 1947 English decision R. v. Phillips,115 which explicitly
set forth preventive detention as a legitimate purpose of bail
determination had a ripple effect in Canada. At first, the Eng-
lish precedent was rejected. In R. v. Samuelson," 6 (like Phil-
lips, a case of a persistent house burglar) the Supreme Court
rejected Phillips noting that it found "disturbing... that [Phil-
lips] strikes a new note and suggests a meaning and purpose in
the whole process of arrest and bail which were not there before
or to be found in any previous authority-the purpose, that is,
of prevention."1 7 Nevetheless, the Phillips court's concept of
preventive detention as an important purpose of bail was even-
tually adopted by Canadian courts in a variety of situations." 8
Courts justified the assertion of preventive detention, as a pur-
pose of bail, as deriving from the "entirely discretionary" powers
to admit bail conferred by the Canadian Code. 119
The work of the Manhattan Bail Project in the U.S. in-
spired a Canadian reformer, Martin Friedland, to study bail
112 R. v. Stewart, [1900] 4 C.C.C. 131 (Man. Q.B.); R. v. Gottfried, [1906] 10
C.C.C. 239 (B.C. Co. Ct.); R. v. Fortier, [1902] 6 C.C.C. 191 (Que. K.B.).
113 See R. v. Gottfried, [1906] 10 C.C.C. 239 (B.C. Co. Ct.); R. v. Fortier, [1902] 6
C.C.C. 191 (Que. KB.).
114 TROTTER, supra note 109, at 8.
115 32 Crim. App. 47 (1947)(Eng.).
116 [1953] 109 C.C.C. 253 (Nfld. T.D.).
117 Id. at 256.
118 See Rodway v. R., [1964] 44 C.R. 327 (Man. Q.B.) (burglary); R. v. Travers,
[1963] 42 C.R. 32 (Que. Q.B.) (assault); R. v. Black, [1969] 1 C.C.C. 82 (B.C. S.C.)
(threat to witnesses). See ThorrER, supra note 109, at 9-10.
119 Rodway, 44 C.R. at 329. Prior to the Bail Reform Act, the Criminal Code
said that in considering bail "[t]he judge or magistrate may, upon the production of
any material that he considers necessary upon the application, order that the ac-
cused be admitted to bail." Criminal Code, ch. 51, 1953-1954 S.C. § 463(3)(Can.).
See TROTrER, supra note 109, at 10.
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practices in the Toronto Magistrates Court. 120 Friedland deter-
mined that the existing bail procedures caused many defend-
ants to be jailed when there were less onerous ways of ensuring
their appearance at trial.12 1 Furthermore, he found widespread
evidence of inequities in the application of the laws based on
economic status. 122 Finally, he was disturbed to find that per-
sons detained before trial received higher sentences than simi-
larly situated defendants on bail, which he theorized was due to
the fact that jailed defendants had less opportunity to assist in
their own defense.123
The combination of Friedland's study and the generally
more rights oriented atmosphere of the 1960's led to the ap-
pointment of a Royal Commission 124 and subsequently the Ca-
nadian Committee on Corrections (CCC)12 5 to examine bail
practices and to recommend reforms. The CCC report recom-
mended sweeping suggestions: the enlargment of the right of
police to bail;126 the establishment of explicit criteria for bail
determination; 127 the limitation of money bail and the expan-
sion of release; 128 the requirement that a judge show cause in
writing for a denial of bail and that the prosecution have the
burden of proof as to denial of bail. 129 Most of the CCC's recom-
mendations were incorporated into the Bail Reform Act of 1972,
and were subsequently codified into §§ 515-526 of the Criminal
Code. However, despite the "rights protecting ethos" of the Bail
Reform Act, the Act incorporated preventive detention as a le-
gitimate reason for the denial of bail.13 °
120 M.L. FRIEDLAND, DETENTION BEFORE TRIAL: A STUDY OF CASES TRIED IN
THE TORONTO MAGISTRATES COURTS (1965).
121 Id. at 43-44.
122 Id. at 182-184.
123 Id.
124 Royal Commission (Ontario) Inquiry into Civil Rights (1968).
125 CANADIAN COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS, TOWARD UNITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND CORRECTIONS (1969) [hereinafter CCC Report].
126 Id. at 114-115.
127 Id. at 108-109.
128 Id. at 107.
129 Id. at 99.
130 Criminal Code, ch. 51, 1953-1954 S.C. § 515(10)(6) (Can.). See Daniel
Kiselbach, Pre-trial Criminal Procedure: Preventive Detention and the Presump-
tion of Innocence, 33 Crum L. Q. 168-194.
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Section 515(10) sets out the only two grounds justifying the
detention of an accused in custody: 131
(a) on the primary ground that his detention is necessary to en-
sure his attendance in court ... ; and
(b) on the secondary ground (the applicability of which shall be
determined only in the event that his detention is not justified
[under] (a), that his detention is necessary in the public interest or
for the safety of the public, having regard to all the circumstances
including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if he is
released from custody, commit a criminal offense or interfere with
the administration of justice. (emphasis added).132
The broad language of § 515(10)(b) has been widely criti-
cized, particularly the phrase "public interest." Professor Trot-
ter 133 has called it a "broad and nebulous concept"; Daniel
Kiselbach avers that it "provides an especially nebulous ground
for preventive detention."134 Early court decisions bore out this
concern. In Re Powers and R,139 Justice Lerner recognized the
duality between "public interest" and "safety of the public." He
also determined that even when the "safety of the public" did
not justify the detention of a defendant, the public's right to feel
safe and secure justified the refusal of bail. 136
The opinion of Culliton, CJS in R. v. Demyen137 is reflective
of how judges saw the "public interest" language as a broad
grant of discretionary power: "In my opinion, in the determina-
tion of what may constitute public interest, Parliament in-
tended to give the judge a wide and unfettered discretion."' 38
Professor Trotter persuasively disputes the judge's reading of
the legislative history of the Criminal Code. He concluded that
far from granting wide discretion to judges, the Parliament
131 See also R. v. Quinn, [19771 34 C.C.C. (2d) 473 (N.S. Co. Ct.); R. v. Batson,
Webb and Conrad, [1977] 21 N.B.R. (2d) 275 (C.A.) (establishing that there is no
residual authority to refuse bail outside § 515(10)). See Kiselbach, supra note 130,
at 172.
132 Quinn, 34 C.C.C. (2d) at 473; Batson, 21 (C.A.).
133 TROTTER, supra note 109, at 88-89.
134 KISELBACH, supra note 130, at 173.
135 [1972] 9 C.C.C. (2d) 533 (subnom Powers v. R) (Ont.H.C.) (Powers was a
repeat burglar).
136 Id. at 544-545.
137 [1975] 26 C.C.C. (2d) 324 (Sask. CA.).
138 Id. at 326. Followed in R. v. Kingwatsiak, [19761 31 C.C.C. (2d) 213
(N.W.T.S.C.); R. v. Morenstein, [1977] 40 C.C.C. (2d) 131, 133 (Ont. C.A.).
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wished to contain it. The "public interest" language was meant
as nothing more than a foundational expression of the general
goal of the law. 139 Nonetheless, it gave judges seeking to recap-
ture their formerly broad powers of discretion just the means to
do so. 140
The Bail Reform Act of 1972141 was only one part of a rights
revolution in Canada which culminated in the adoption of a
Charter of Rights in 1981.142 Inspired by the United States Bill
of Rights, 143 reformers believed that until a fundmental law
protecting individual liberties was enacted, the rights of
Canadians would not be safe. The adoption of the Charter pro-
vided a set of legal principles that transcended the ordinary en-
actments of Parliament.
Section 11(e)14 of the Charter guarantees that "[any per-
son charged with an offense has a right not to be denied bail
without just cause." Furthermore, Section 11(d) guarantees the
"right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty."145 Finally,
Section 7 assures "the right to life, liberty and security of person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice." 146
It was inevitable that these three interrelated rights would
collide with judicial precedents that allowed persons to be
preventively detained in furtherance of some nebulously de-
fined concept of the "public interest." That challenge came in R.
v. Morales.147 Morales concerned an accused cocaine trafficker
believed to be associated with a Colombian drug cartel. He was
denied bail under the preventive detention provisions in
§ 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code. The question certified for ap-
139 TROrER, supra note 109, at 88-90.
140 Id. at 90.
141 Bail Reform Act, S.C. (1972)(Can.).
142 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
143 U.S. CONST. amend. I-X
144 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 11(e).
145 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 11(d).
146 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 7.
147 77 C.C.C. (3d) at 91. Morales was decided by the Supreme Court of Can-
ada, the body charged with interpreting the Charter of Rights.
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peal was whether § 515(10)(b) violated Morales' fundmental
rights under § 7 of the Charter and his right not to be denied
bail without just cause under § 11(e) of the Charter.
The court noted § 515(10)(b) allowed detention under two
grounds "public interest" and "protection or safety of the pub-
hc."148 The court first examined the "public interest" issue.
While noting that it primarily was evaluating the law under
§ 11(e) of the Charter, the court admitted that its analysis
would "draw considerable support from the constitutional doc-
trine of vagueness which has been articulated as a principle of
fundamental justice."149 The court also found that the "public
interest" grounds for preventive detention violated fundamental
justice under § 7. The court noted that a law "does not violate
the doctrine of vagueness simply because it is subject to inter-
pretation." 5 0 Rather, it does so only when it is "[in]capable of
being given a constant and settled meaning."15 The court fur-
ther held that the broad interpretation of "public interest" pro-
vided in Demyen and Powers demonstrated that the term
provided "no guidance for legal debate" and, in fact, "author-
ize[d] a standardless sweep, as the court could order imprison-
ment whenever it [saw] fit."152
After declaring the public interest grounds "void for vague-
ness," in American parlance, the Court went on to uphold the
"public safety" component.' 53 The court determined that the
"scope of the public safety component. .. [was] sufficiently nar-
row to satisfy [the "just cause"] provisions of § 11(e)." 15 4 It
noted that bail was only denied to those who posed a "substan-
tial likelihood" of committing a future offense and only when
this substantial likelihood endangered the "protection or safety
of the public." Furthermore, it justified denial of bail only when
148 Id. at 98.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 101.
151 Id. at 102.
152 77 C.C.C. (3d) at 103. (tenses changed.)
153 Id. at 105.
154 Id. at 106-107.
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it was "necessary" for public safety not "merely... convenient
or advantageous." 155
At first glance, Morales represents a step forward for the
rights of defendants to bail. Certainly, it wiped away judicial
precedents indicating that magistrates could deny bail to an ac-
cused burglar for the sole purpose of allowing property owners
to feel safer. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's affirmation of
the public safety provision ensures that preventive detention
will remain a part of Canadian bail law for years to come.
VI. OTHER COMMON LAw NATIONS
A. Introduction
The succeeding waves of agitation for bail reforms, new bail
legislation, constitutional changes and the judicial reactions to
these innovations in the major English-speaking nations could
not be ignored by the smaller tier of common law nations. Many
of these nations still commonly cite English and Canadian
precedents and use law treatises from North America and the
United Kingdom.
Many common law nations underwent their own bail re-
form movements, often inspired by U.S. and British examples.
Typically, when local social critics attempted to replicate the ex-
periments of the Vera Foundation and Martin Friedland they
found similar problems. However, local conditions and legal
histories shaped the result of the reforms, especially as to pre-
ventive detention.
B. Australia: New South Wales
Like the United States (and unlike Canada and the U.K.),
Australia has a federal system whereby criminal law is con-
trolled by the individual state governments. Federal criminal
procedure only affects a small number of federal offenses.
Therefore, when bail reform came to Australia, it took the form
of local movements in each of the states. Throughout the late
1970's and early 1980's, several Australian states adopted new
bail laws (Victoria, 1977; New South Wales, 1978; Western Aus-
155 Id. at 107. The court went on to declare that the unconstitutional "public
interest" language could be severed from § 515(10)(b), this avoiding striking down
the entire preventive detention provisions of the Criminal Code. Id. at 110-111.
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tralia, 1982; Northern Territory, 1982 and South Australia,
1985). The most extensively documented of these movements is
that of New South Wales.
Until amended, the Australian Courts Act of 1928156 pro-
vided that all the precedents and acts in force in England form
the basis of criminal law in New South Wales. 157 The first New
South Wales case to set out the grounds for refusing bail was R.
v. Campbell.158 The Campbell court affirmed that the primary
factor in bail determinations was the likelihood that the ac-
cused would appear at trial. To assess this issue, the court ap-
plied a version of the Robinson test analyzing the nature of the
crime, the probability of conviction and the severity of the pun-
ishment sought. 159
However, the interest in preventive detention was high-
lighted in a case decided in 1966, R. v. Appleby. 160 In Appleby,
the court held that in considering bail for a persistent offender,
a court should not only examine the accused's likelihood of ap-
pearing at trial, but also the "public interest," including the de-
sirability of curbing future offenses by the defendant. The court
proposed that this public interest be weighed against the possi-
bility of prejudice to the accused of being detained before
trial. 161
In 1976, the New South Wales government appointed com-
mittees to examine possible bail reform and to review criminal
procedure in the state. The results of these two panels were
then incorporated into a 1977 report of the Criminal Law Re-
view Division of the Office of the Attorney General. 162 The Divi-
sion's report was considered by the cabinet and formed the basis
156 Australian Courts Act, 9 Geo. IV, ch. 83 (1928)(Austl.).
157 Imperial Acts Application Act, 1969, ch. 2 (Eng.). This modified the Austra-
lian Courts Act of 1928, setting out the specific British acts that apply in New
South Wales.
158 R. v. Campbell, Sydney Morning Herald, April 29, 1850. R. v. Fraser, 13
N.S.W.L.R. 150 (1892) (Austl.).
159 Id.
160 1 N.S.W.R. 35 (1966) (Austl.).
161 This logic was followed inR. v. Wakefield, 98 N.S.W.W.N. (Pt. I) 325 (1969)
(Austl.).
162 B.H.K DONOVAN, THE LAw OF BAIL: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND PRINCIPLES
3-5 (1981). The report incorporated suggestions from police, corrections officials,
judges, members of the defense bar and prosecutors office, social workers and
members of the Institute of Criminology of the Sydney University Law School. Id.
at 4.
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of the Bail Act 1978.163 Although the report was not released,
the primary concerns of the reformers were to make bail more
equitable to the poor, establish clear procedures for bail applica-
tions and to "[downgrade the means of getting bail] as a rele-
vant factor and money or surety as a bail condition." 164
One primary result of the Bail Act 1978165 was to create a
rebuttable presumption in favor of bail for all offenses, except
bail absconding 166 and armed robbery. 16 7 Persons accused of
murder and rape benefit from the presumption. 68 For crimes
not punishable by imprisonment, bail is an absolute right un-
less the accused has previously jumped bail. 169 The burden of
proof placed on the court or officer granting bail is the civil stan-
dard, preponderance of the evidence. 170
Section 32 outlines the factors to be weighed in determining
whether to rebut the presumption towards bail. The court's dis-
cretion to deny bail is purposely limited: "In making a determi-
nation . . . an authorized officer or court shall take into
consideration the following matters . . . and the following mat-
ters only." (emphasis added). 171 Those matters include:
(a) the probability of whether or not the person will appear in
court;
(b) the interests of the person;
(c) the protection and welfare of the community .... 172
In determining whether to deny bail for the protection and wel-
fare of the community, the court may only consider:
(i) whether the person has failed ... to observe a bail condition
163 Id.
164 Adrian Roden, forward to B.H.K DONOVAN, THE LAW OF BAIL: PRACTICE,
PROCEDURE AND PRINCIPLES at ix (1981).
165 Bail Act, No. 161 (1978) (Austl.).
166 Id. at § 9(1)(b).
167 Id. at § 9(1)(c).
168 DONOVAN, supra note 162. However, persons accused of these crimes are
usually denied bail as flight risks or under the preventive detention provisions of
the Act. Id. at 72-73.
169 Id. at § 8.
170 Bail Act, No. 161, § 59.
171 Id. § 32.
172 Id. § 32(1).
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(ii) the likelihood of the person interfering with evidence, wit-
nesses or jurors;
(iii) the likelihood that the person will or will not commit an of-
fense while at liberty on bail. 173
Furthermore, if a magistrate seeks to deny bail under
§ 32(c)(iii), the requirements of § 32(2) must be satisfied:
the authorized officer or court may only have regard to the likeli-
hood that the person will commit such an offense.., if the officer
or court is:
(a) satisfied the person is likely to commit it;
(b) satisfied that it is likely to involve violence or otherwise be se-
rious by reason of its likely consequences; AND
(c) satisfied that the likelihood that the person will commit it, to-
gether with the likely consequences, outweigh's the person's gen-
eral right to be at liberty." (emphasis added). 174
Section 32 seems to balance the interests involved in a preven-
tive detention law and places the burden on the court to justify
the denial of bail. It requires a showing of a strong, particular-
ized danger to the public interest that outweighs the accused's
right to liberty before trial. Finally, they make clear that only a
danger to persons, not property, justifies such an imposition on
the defendant's rights.
The Bail Act did not end the debate over bail in New South
Wales. Reflecting the ebbs and flows of opinion on crime and
the criminal justice system, typical throughout the English
speaking world, the application of the Act has been criticized
from both the political right and left. In 1987, a study was pub-
lished by two University of Sydney professors that indicated the
state held a higher proportion of prisoners than any other Aus-
tralian state.175 The professors blamed this on the fact that
judges were too likely to approve the denial of bail by police,
who in turn were refusing bail far more often than necessary.
They noted that when police were forced to offer bail more freely
during a recent corrections strike, there was no appreciable in-
crease in failure to appear at trial.
173 Id. § 32(1)(c).
174 Id. § 32(2)
175 Jenny David & Paul Ward, Police Discretion in the Granting of Bail, 11
CRIM. L. J. 325 (1987).
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Conversely, the New South Wales parliament, as part of
domestic violence legislation, recently removed the presumption
for bail when a person was charged with murder or a "domestic
violence offense" when the accused had a history of violence. 1 76
Because Australia and New South Wales have no Bill of
Rights or constitutional provisions ensuring individual rights,
that aspect of the bail question has not been judicially explored.
However, recently Australian legal scholars have begun to dis-
cuss the possibility that certain liberties are implicitly protected
in a free society. Justice Murphy of the Australian Supreme
Court has postulated that there are "freedoms so elementary
that it was not necessary to mention them in the Constitution
.... The Freedoms are not absolute, but nearly so .... The
freedoms may not be restricted by the Parliament or state Par-
liaments except for compelling reasons."177 Justice Murphy has
not enumerated these fundamental rights, but they are pre-
sumed to include the right to due process of law.178 Further-
more, there is also a strong movement for the adoption of an
Australian charter of rights. 79 These ideas are still developing,
but it is possible to imagine that bail provisions could some day
be reviewed under a fundamental rights analysis.
C. New Zealand
Because New Zealand has no formal bail statute, one must
look to judicial precedent to determine the outline of the law. 180
The history of the nation's bail law begins with the New Zea-
land Supreme Court's adoption of Justice Coleridge's three-part
Robinson test in R. v. Valli.18 ' By doing so, the Court accepted
appearance at trial as the primary purpose of bail. However, in
176 Bail Act of 1993, § 4 (Austl.). Under § 4, the presumption in favor of bail is
removed in cases where the accused in charged with murder or a domestic violence
offense involving violence or intimidation if the accused has a history of violence.
See Review of Australian Criminal Legislation, 1993, 18 CRIM. L. J. 156 (1994).
177 Ansett Transport Industries Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 139 C.L.R. 54, 88
(1977) (Austl.) (Aickin, J., dictum).
178 Leslie Zines, A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 166,
180-184 (1994).
179 MURRAY B. WILCOX, AN AusTRALLAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS (1993).
180 Steven Zindel, A Principled Approach to Bail, [1993] N.Z.L.J. 49. See CRIM-
xNAL LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, REPORT ON BAIL (1982).
181 23 N.Z.L.R. 27 (1903) (citing R. v. Robinson, 23 L.J.Q.B. 286 (1854)).
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R. v. Vincent,'8 2 the Supreme Court adopted the logic of the
Phillips court and denied bail to a persistent burglar on the
grounds that he was likely to commit crimes while on bail.
Since Vincent, an increasingly broad view of "public interest"
has been invoked to preventively detain New Zealand
defendants.
In Hubbard v. Police,'88 the court denied bail to an alleged
rapist with prior assault convictions on the grounds that he
might rape again. The court held that "two main tests" have to
be considered before granting bail. First, the court must be sat-
isfied that the defendant will appear at trial. Second, the court
must weigh the "public interest."8 4 The Hubbard court listed
five public interest criteria:
(i) How speedy or how delayed is the trial of the defendant likely
to be;
(ii) Whether there is a risk of the defendant tampering with
witnesses;
(iii) Whether there is a risk the defendant will re-offend while on
bail;
(iv) The possibility of prejudice to the defense in the preparation
of their defense;
(v) Any other special matter that is relevant in the particular cir-
cumstances to the public interest.' 85
Whereas criteria (i) and (iv) attempt to weigh the defendant's
liberty interest, the other factors give the bail magistrate con-
siderable discretion, criteria (v) in particular.
Hubbard was followed by Simeon v. Police.'86 Simeon con-
cerned an 18-year-old charged with assault. In ruling to deny
bail, Justice Robertson averred that although the presumption
of innocence was a "crucial element of New Zealand's criminal
justice system," 8 7 it should be weighed against the evidence
presented by the police. Although the court determined that
there was little or no risk that the accused youth would not ap-
pear at trial, and it found no particular evidence that he was
182 [1950] N.Z.L.R. 653 (citing R. v. Phillips, 32 Crim. App. 47 (1947)(Eng.)).
183 2 N.Z.L.R. 738 (1986).
184 Id. at 739.
185 Id.
186 2 N.Z.L.R. 116 (1990).
187 Id.
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likely to commit future offenses, the court held it was "contrary
to the public interest to leave Simeon free in the community
when there was a virtual inevitability of conviction." 188 Thus,
while ostensibly affirming the importance of the presumption of
innocence, the court decided that a person could be detained
before trial if the court decided-without a trial-that convic-
tion was "inevitable."18 9
The Orwellian reasoning found in Simeon may soon face
the scrutiny of a fundamental rights analysis. In 1990, the New
Zealand parliament enacted the Bill of Rights Act.' 90 Section
24(b) of the Bill of Rights guarantees that persons charged with
an offense be released on "reasonable terms and condition un-
less there is just cause for continued detention."19 1 Section
25(e) recognizes the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty.192 Although there is yet no judicial treatment of these
provisions, the language appears to give support to overruling
the Hubbard line of cases.' 93
Particularly relevant to this topic was the Court of Appeals
decision in R. Crime Appeals.-94 In that case, which concerned
the right to counsel provisions, the majority of the court took an
expansive view of the Bill of Rights. What is most significant
for the interpretation of sections 24(b) and 25(e) is that the Bill
of Rights was consciously modeled on the Canadian Charter of
Rights. 195 One commentator 96 has already suggested that the
Canadian Supreme Court's rulings concerning the Charter be
used to interpret the bail provisions of the Bill of Rights, and he
did so before the Morales case was decided.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Bill of Rights Act (1990) (N.Z.). See J. Elkind, Interpreting the Bill of Rights,
[1991] N.Z.L.J. 15-16.
191 Zindel, supra note 180, at 50.
192 Zindel, supra note 180, at 50.
193 Zindel, supra note 180, at 53.
194 227/91, 228/91 (N.Z.C.A.) (1991), (discussed in Anthony Shaw & Andrew S.
Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Comes Alive (I), [1991] N.Z.L.J. 400). See
Mark Corlett, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Right to Counsel, 7
AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 579 (1994).
195 Janet November, Detention and the Right to Counsel: Canadian and New
Zealand Jurisprudence, [1994] N.Z.L.J. 227. See discussion of Canadian Charter
of Rights supra part V.
196 Zindel, supra note 180, at 50-51.
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D. South Africa
1. Apartheid Era
The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 197719 set out the South
African bail procedure. Similar to England's Bail Act 1976,198
the three ordinary grounds for refusing bail are risk of flight,
the possibility of further criminal acts and the possibility of in-
terference with the course of justice. In "ordinary" situations,
South African courts have traditionally been reluctant to deny
bail to prevent future crimes. 199 However, § 61 of the Criminal
Procedure Act gave the Attorney General the power to prevent
the granting of bail in cases of arson, murder, kidnapping, rob-
bery, housebreaking and any conspiracy, incitement or attempt
to commit the above offenses. In addition, even greater powers
to deter bail were granted under the Internal Security Act.
200
Furthermore, courts under the apartheid regime had no com-
punction against denying bail if public security was
implicated.20
2. Post-apartheid South Africa
The African National Congress inherited the reins of South
Africa with much of the security and judicial systems in place.
Although some of the hated security laws have been repealed,
the ever-present threat of a white minority rebellion, a Zulu-
Xhosi ethnic war or merely continuing hooliganism by "town-
ship boys," is likely to delay any serious legislative reform of the
system for the time being. In 1992, a Commonwealth Observer
Mission to South Africa (COMSA) visited the country to provide
practical assistance to the nation in dealing with the ongoing
violence. COMSA's second report,20 2 issued in 1993, described
its study of the South African criminal justice system, with an
197 Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, (1977) (S. Aft.).
198 Bail Act, 1976, ch. 63 (Eng.).
199 McCarthy v. R., [1906] T.S. 657; S. v. Fourie, [1973] 1 S.A. 100 (Durban).
Contra S. v. Patel, [1970] 3 S.A. 565 (Witwatersrand).
200 Internal Security Act, No. 44 § 12B (1950) (S. Afr.).
201 S. v. Mhlawai, [1963] 3 S.A. 795; S. v. Baker, [1965] 1 S.A. 821, 827 (Witwa-
tersrand); S. v. Nangutuuala [1973] 4 S.A. 640,643 (South West Africa). See J.
DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 250-257 (1978).
202 THE SOCIETY FOR THE REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAW AND RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW, COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA, PHASE II
REPORT (1993).
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emphasis on bail, witness protection and prisons, and issued
recommendations for criminal justice reform.20 3
Act 200 of the 1993 Constitution 2°4 took the first step to-
ward reforming the law of bail in South Africa. Section 25(1) of
the Act gives detainees the right to be informed, in their own
language, of the charge for which they are detained; the right to
consult an attorney (at state cost, if necessary); the right to re-
ceive visitors; the right to adequate food and medical attention
and the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.
Section 25(2) provides the right to remain silent.20 5
Section 25(2)(b) establishes as a right that "as soon as rea-
sonably possible," but not later than 48 hours, the accused must
"be brought before an ordinary court of law and charged or be
informed of the reason for his or her further detention, failing
which he or she shall be entitled to be released." Subsection (d)
creates the right "to be released from detention with or without
bail, unless the interests of justice require otherwise."
Although one might argue that broad language like "interests of
justice" in subsection (d) gives the South African legislature
fairly wide latitude in framing a reformed bail law, it is clear
that the rights created in the 1993 Constitution are quite dra-
matic given the history of the nation. These provisions have al-
ready been invoked to judicially challenge the old bail laws. 20 6
Although that effort failed on technical grounds, the new consti-
tution provides a good foundation for future bail reform.
203 Christopher Munnion, S. African Justice "Flawed", DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 18, 1992, at 12; South Africa: Commonwealth Observer Mission
Leaves, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, June 1, 1993.
204 CONST. S. AFR. 1993 (Act No. 200).
205 § 25(2)(a),(c).
206 De Kock v. Prokureur-Generaal, [1994 3 S.A. 785 (Transvaal). Unfortu-
nately, the challenge arose in the wrong court, the Supreme Court. Reading
§ 101(3) with § 98(2)(c),(3) of the 1993 Constitution, the Supreme Court held that
determining the constitutional validity of the bail law was the sole jurisdiction of
the new Constitutional Court. Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51, § 61 (1977) (S. Afr.).
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VII. MODEL PRINCIPLES DRAwN FROM COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Preventive detention by openly stated legislative policy is
inherently better than preventive detention
by subterfuge.
Persons may differ on whether preventive detention is such
a significant imposition on liberty as to seriously impair the pre-
sumption of innocence. Indeed, it is clear that when abused,
rules allowing preventive detention can lead to oppressive re-
sults. The New Zealand cases of Hubbard and Simeon make
that clear. However, the impact of the use of high money bail as
a subterranean form of preventive detention is likely to never
be fully assessed, because it is hidden and not subject to judicial
review. Yet, studies in the U.S. indicate it is widespread there.
It seems clear that at least some common law judges in all of
the surveyed countries would find a way to detain persons they
deem dangerous, whether or not there was a preventive deten-
tion law. It appears that tightly conceived preventive detention
measures may be the best way to ensure fairness and equity in
this decision-making process.
B. Provisions for preventive detention must be narrowly
crafted as to not detract from a fundamental
presumption toward the granting of bail.
Because the presumption of innocence is a fundamental
human right, persons should not suffer deprivation of liberty
without a strong showing by the state that such a deprivation
serves a specific and very strong public interest. This places the
burden of proving the need to preventively detain on the state.
Laws like the U.S. Bail Reform Act that shift the burden to the
defendant in certain circumstances are troubling.
C. There must be legislatively determined grounds for bail
refusal but, these grounds must incorporate only two
interests: the defendant's right to liberty and to be
presumed innocent and the state's interest in
protecting public safety and integrity of the
judicial process.
Because the deprivation of a person's liberty before trial is
such a grave matter, it must only be undertaken under the most
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narrowly proscribed manner. The law setting out the bail pro-
cedures must require the judge to certify that a concrete
probability of danger to the public or judicial process must exist
before a person is preventively detained. The factors used to
make the determination must balance the accused's strong lib-
erty rights. An example of a well-constructed bail act is that of
New South Wales.
D. Judges must have some discretion in application of these
rules, but must be specific in assigning grounds for
refusal of bail.
Although the operation of any statutory bail scheme re-
quires judicial discretion, the language of the bail act must not
leave room for too much discretion. The broad interpretation of
the "public interest" provision of the Canadian bail law by the
Powers and Demyen courts indicates the danger of allowing
judges to frame policy. The fine-tuned balancing of public inter-
est and private liberties incorporated into a bail law should not
be set awry by the whims of a judge. In order to insure this does
not occur, judges should be required to set out in writing the
reasons for any preventive detention determination.
E. Any denial of bail based on the public interest must be
grounded on a concrete and particularized threat to the
public safety or judicial process.
The prosecutor should not be allowed to allege that some
general threat to the public interest is implicated. Moreover,
they should not be able to allege, as the Powers court did, that
the public's right to "feel safe" is implicated. Thus, they must be
required to point to a specific danger posed by the particular
person being detained.
F. Any denial of bail based on the public safety must be
based on a threat to the safety of persons, not property.
The right to liberty and the presumption of innocence is too
valuable to be denied on the assertion of the state's right to pro-
tect property, despite the opinion of the Phillips court. The New
South Wales bail act is correct to make violent crimes against
persons the exclusive public interest protected.
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G. There should be a right to appeal a preventive
detention determination.
As a further check on the abuse of judicial discretion, a de-
fendant should be allowed to appeal a refusal of bail expedi-
tiously, even without showing new circumstances. If the
appellate court believes that the presiding judge abused his dis-
cretion, the prosecution should be allowed to appeal bail re-
lease. However, the defendant should be allowed to remain on
bail until the appeal is determined. The primary purpose of
such a right to appeal would be to ensure that trial judges are
held accountable and adhere to the guidelines, not to ensure
that every detainee gets two bail hearings. Therefore, there
should be latitude in creating an efficient means of handling
bail appeals.
H. The right to fair bail, the right to be presumed innocent,
and the right not to subjected to imprisonment without
due process of law are fundamental rights and
should be protected by a Bill or Charter of Rights.
Throughout this survey, it has been apparent that the
existence of a fundamental law protecting personal liberties has
been valuable in ensuring that legislative responses to the prob-
lem of crime did not infringe on basic rights. It is also clear that
such a fundamental law does not prevent the legislature from
passing statutes allowing courts to preventively detain defend-
ants who meet ascertainable requirements. Because liberty is
so precious and the pressing need to combat crime is often so
great, such a body of fundamental law is vital to the just func-
tioning of preventive detention within the ancient institution of
bail.
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APPENDIX: MODEL PRE-TRIAL RELEASE AND
DETENTION STATUTE
§ 1. Pre-Trial Release and Detention: General Principles
Persons are entitled as a matter of right to be released before
trial. This right is closely associated with the right to personal
liberty, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
and the right to assist in one's own defense. The right to pre-
trial release is subject, however, to the state's strong interest in
protecting the effectiveness and efficiency of the judicial pro-
cess, and in protecting its citizens from preventable harm. In
order to assert this interest to abridge the right of a person ac-
cused of a crime to be released pending trial, the state must
show a clear and particularized purpose for the abridgement,
and must narrowly tailor any conditions, including denial of re-
lease, to this identified purpose. The legislature enjoins the
courts to apply this Statute in a manner consistent with the
principles of this section.
§ 2. Pre-Trial Release: Misdemeanor Offenses
a. Any person charged with a misdemeanor offense shall be en-
titled to pre-trial release on his or her own recognizance
under only such conditions as to ensure his or her presence
at trial.
b. If a judge determines that conditions would ensure the per-
son's attendance at trial, that judge may order that the per-
son be detained prior to trial under the provisions of (c) of
this section.
c. A judicial determination that a person shall be denied pre-
trial release on the grounds that there is no other reasonable
method of ensuring the person's appearance at trial shall be
set out in a written decision that is based on the factors listed
in § 3 of this chapter.
d. Conditions employed to ensure a persons presence at trial
may include restrictions of travel, the deposit of a sum of
money, or any financial sureties narrowly tailored to prevent
flight from the jurisdiction.
e. The burden of proving the reasonableness of conditions of re-
lease or denial of release is on the prosecution and must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
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§ 3. Factors Used to Determine Risk of Non-Appearance
a. In making a determination that denial of pre-trial release is
necessary to ensure a person's presence at trial, the judge or
magistrate shall make reference only to the following factors:
[list would include normal community ties, prior bail history,
etc.]
§ 4. Pretrial Release and Detention: Felony Offenses;
Preventive Detention
a. Any person charged with a felony offense shall be entitled to
pre-trial release on his or her own recognizance under only such
conditions as to:
(i) ensure his or her presence at trial, or
(ii) ensure that person does not harm himself or any other
person.
b. If a judge determines that no conditions would ensure the
person's attendance at trial, that judge may order that person
detained prior to trial under the provisions of § 2(c) and § 3 of
this chapter.
c. If a judge determines that no conditions would ensure that
the person would not harm himself or herself, or any other per-
son, that judge may order that person detained prior to trial
under the provisions of (d) of this section.
d. A judicial determination that a person shall be denied pre-
trial release on the grounds that there is no other reasonable
method of ensuring that the person would not harm himself or
herself, or any other person shall be set out in a written decision
that is based on the factors listed in § 5 of this chapter.
e. Conditions employed to ensure a person's presence at trial
may include restrictions of travel, the deposit of a sum of
money, or any financial sureties narrowly tailored to prevent
flight from jurisdiction.
f. The burden of proving the reasonableness of conditions of re-
lease or denial of release is on the prosecution and must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
§ 5. Factors Justifying Preventive Detention
a. In making a determination that a person be detained prior to
trial on the grounds that they may harm himself or herself, the
[Vol. 8:399
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judge shall require a certification of the person's mental condi-
tion by means of a psychological evaluation.
b. In making a determination that pre-trial release be denied to
a person on the grounds that such denial is necessary to prevent
the detainee from harming a person, or persons, or the public in
general, the judge shall evaluate only the following factors:
(i) whether the offense involved violence or serious threat of
violence;
(ii) whether the element of the offense involving violence is
admitted by the defendant [as in a justification defense];
(iii) whether the element of the offense involving violence is
likely to be proved at trial;
(iv) whether the accused has been previously convicted of an
offense involving violence;
(v) whether the accused has been previously charged with
more than one offense involving violence;
(vi) whether the accused has been previously convicted or
charged with an offense involving domestic violence or
stalking and one of those two offenses is charged in the
instant case;
(vii) whether the accused violently resisted arrest or acted vio-
lently while incarcerated;
(viii) whether the accused ever committed an offense involving
violence while under pre-trial release awaiting trial for
other offenses;
(ix) whether the accused ever committed an offense while
under pre-trial release awaiting trial for an offense involv-
ing violence;
(x) any psychological evaluation undertaken in the previous
year that indicates that the accused is likely to harm
other persons;
(xi) any sworn testimony by direct witnesses that goes to the
issue of the accused's propensity for violence.
§ 6. Appeal of Denial of Pre-Trial Release by Defendant
a. Any denial of pre-trial release, on any grounds, may be im-
mediately appealed. The reviewing court shall expeditiously re-
view the trial judge's written decision to determine whether the
judge abused his or her discretion or erred in interpreting the
Statute. If the appellate court determines that the trial court
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erred in its denial of bail, it may either grant pre-trial release
through the jurisdiction granted by this section, or remand for a
rehearing of the pre-trial release determination.
§ 7. Appeal of Pre-Trail Release Decision by Prosecutor
a. A prosecutor may appeal a decision to grant release on the
grounds that the trial judge abused his or her discretion or
erred in interpreting the Statute. The defendant may remain
on pre-trial release while the appellate court considers the is-
sue. The appellate court may also order that the trial go for-
ward pending its decision, to ensure the defendant's right to a
speedy trial.
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